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ABSTRACT 
Interim analysis in clinical trials is discussed from the point of 
view of both classical hypothesis testing and Bayesian inference. The 
application of P-values in this setting is criticized. The ad hoc approach 
is recommended over adjusting P-values for the possibility of stopping the 
trial earlier or later. A Bayesian approach is presented in which stopping 
occurs when the probability that one treatment is better exceeds a specified 
value. 
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When a researcher peruses accumulating data from a clinical trial 
with a possibility of early termination, certain kinds of inferences to 
be drawn from the trial may be affected. This is well understood by 
biometricians but not by researchers (McPherson 1982). Readers of 
medical journals do not ask whether a trial might have been stopped 
sooner· but was not; they take the data at face value. And yet classical 
Neyman-Pearsonian tests require specifying all possibilities in advance. 
Important deviations from protocol can make classical inferences impossi-
ble. This is one reason, perhaps the most important reason, that sequen-
tial designs of clinical trials have been so little used (Simon 1977, 
Byar et al. 1974). 
Biostatisticians have had a substantial impact on this aspect of the 
design of clinical trials. Dissidents (Anscombe 1963, Cornfield 1966, 
Weinstein 1974, Berry 1980) have had essentially no effect on statistical 
practice. This controversial issue is an important one: at stake is 
human suffering and financial resources of sponsoring agencies and 
pharmaceutical companies. If some trials last too long and others end 
prematurely because statisticians disallow looking at accumulating data 
or continuing beyond the planned trial termination, then the statistical 
principle on which this is based should have a solid foundation. 
A purpose of this paper is to describe implications of classical 
hypothesis testing for interim analysis. Strict adherence to classical 
testing is criticized. A less rigid view--one that will offend some 
-1-
7 
purists but appeal to clinicians--is advocated. The Bayesian approach 
is discussed. 
At the heart of the controversy is the distinction between P-values 
and probabilities of hypotheses. This issue is discussed in the next two 
sections; a likelihood approach is discussed in Section 3. The classical 
approach to interim analysis is discussed in Sections 4 and 5 and compared 
to a Bayesian approach in Section 5. These are related in Section 6 to 
an ad hoc approach taken by most researchers. This ad hoc approach uses 
classical fixed size analyses imbedded in a Bayesian philosophy. 
2. P-values and Neyman-Pearson Testing 
Most consumers of statistical inference incorrectly regard a P-value 
as related to the probability of the truth of a null hypothesis. They 
act as though H0 is false when the P-value is sufficiently small--usually 
less than 0.05--feeling that their action is correct with some high 
probability. 
Calculating the probability of H
0 
from available data requires the 
use of Bayes's theorem. This in turn requires a probability assessment 
of H
0 
separate from (or prior to) the data, and pushes many 11 Bayesians" 
to adopt a subjective view of probability (Savage 1954). Such blatant 
subjectivism repels many statisticians. They refuse to pay this price 
and so reject all Bayesian thought. 
P-values are understood by trained statisticians but by few others. 
For example, two M.D.'s (Diamond and Forrester 1983) asked 24 of their 
colleagues this multiple choice question: "What would you conclude if a 
properly conducted, randomized clinical trial of a treatment was reported 
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to have resulted in a beneficial response (p < 0.05)? 
1. Having obtained the observed response, the chances are less than 
5% that the therapy is not effective. 
2. The chances are less than 5% of not having obtained the observed 
response if the therapy is effective. 
3. The chances are less than 5% of having obtained the observed 
response if the therapy is not effective. 
4. None of the above. 11 
The authors say that all responders had difficulty distinguishing the 
subtle differences between the choices. Of the 24 responders, 11 chose #1 
and one other gave an 11 incorrect 11 answer. The authors say #3 is correct. 
However, #3 requires the insertion "or more extreme responses 11 to be correct. 
As the choices stand, #4 is correct! Interestingly, 19 of the 24 said they 
would prefer to know the answer to #1, the (Bayesian) posterior probability; 
in second place was #2. 
Diamond and Forrester (1983) cite a number of important large-scale 
clinical trials in which a high degree of significance was obtained origi-
nally, but the conclusion was later contradicted. Blaming P-values, they 
make what they call an 11arrogant pronouncement:" "The published conclusions 
of many clinical trials are ill-founded, and may be wrong." They go on 
to claim that these mistakes would not have been made using a Bayesian 
approach .. 
Clinical trials whose results are eventually contradicted do little 
for the credibility of statistics and statisticians. Regardless of what 




, e.g.) are correct with some high probability. This 
expectation involves posterior probabilities and not P-values. If some-
one were to find that more than half the conclusions (at P<0.05) of all 
published clinical trials were wrong, this would not be inconsistent with 
the inferences made from the results of the trials! Disheartening but not 
inconsistent. 
3. Likelihoods vs. Classical Tests 
P-values are tail areas. They are calculated by integrating over 
results more extreme than that obtained, but these more extreme results 
have not themselves been observed. This characteristic prompted Harold 
Jeffreys's (1961) criticism: II a hypothesis which may be true may be 
rejected because it has not predicted observable results which have not 
occurred." The size of the tail affects the inference. 
As an example, consider the following problem: Ten tosses of a 
coin result in 2 heads and 8 tails; test the hypothesis that the coin 
is fair against the one-sided alternative that the probability of heads 
is less than 1/2. The solution depends critically on the intentions of 
the tosser, but when confronted with this problem, few people, statisti-
cians included, ask the key question: Why did the tosser choose to stop? 
If you think this question is irrelevant then you do not take hypothesis 
testing as seriously as do many statisticians--and you might be a Bayesian 
at heart! 
Solution 1. Suppose the tosser planned ten tosses and would have 
allowed nothing to stand in the way of this objective. Then the appropriate 
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distribution is binomial: 
p = [(l~)+ (ln + c~)J m 10,; 0.055. 
Solution 2. Suppose the tosser planned to obtain two heads and 
would have tossed as long as necessary. Then the appropriate distribution 
is negative binomial: 
10 11 12 
p = 9(1) + 10(½) + 11(½) + .•. ~ 0.020. 
Solution 3. Suppose the tosser planned to stop and reject the null 
hypothesis if there were O heads in the first 4 tosses, 1 head after 7 tosses, 
or 2 after 10--stopping after 10 tosses in any case. Backward induction 
gives 
P = 41/512 ~ 0.080 
Solution 4 .. Suppose the tosser planned to continue indefinitely, 
stopping to reject H
0 
as in Solution 3, but also if there were 3 heads in 
14 tosses, 4 in 17, etc. An iterative procedure gives 
P ~ 0. 145. 
Solution 5. Suppose the tosser planned to stop when dinner was ready 
and reject H
0 
i"f the proportion of heads was no greater than 0.2. No 
P-value can be calculated and such data cannot be analyzed legitimately 
using the Neyman-Pearson approach. 
The possibility of different solutions depending on the intentions 
of the experimenter are counter to the likelihood principle (Cornfield 
-5-
1966, Barnett 1973). This principle says, roughly speaking, that two 
sets of data which give rise to the same likelihood function should give 
rise to the same inferences. In the above problem the likelihood of p, 
the probability of heads, is proportional to 
in all five solutions; the proportionality constant which makes this a 
probability for the random variable in question varies depending on the 
solution but is immaterial in the likelihood. 
The likelihood principle implies that the question "Why did the 
tosser stop?" is not relevant for making inferences. (This assumes, of 
course, that the decision to stop is not a function of p, or of future 
observations--for example, tossing stopped when the coin was lost and 
it is more likely to be lost when it is about to land heads.) 
The likelihood principle requires a model under which the data are 
assumed to be produced. If the model is wrong (and it frequently is!) 
then the inferences can be wrong for that reason. A weaker version which 
does not rely on a particular likelihood is the following, which is 
related to the Conditionality Principle (Berger 1980). 
Data Principle: Inferences depend only on the data obtained and 
the experiment performed, and not on data not obtained or on experiments 
contemplated but not performed. 
Objecting to using error probabilities in experimentation, Anscombe 
(1963) says: "'sequential analysis' is a hoax. The correct statistical 
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analysis of the observations consists primarily of quoting the likelihood 
function. So long as all observations made are fairly reported, the 
sequential stopping rule that may or may not have been followed is irrele-
vant. The experimenter should feel entirely uninhibited about continuing 
or discontinuing his trial, changing his mind about the stopping rule in 
the middle, etc., because the interpretation of the observations will be 
based on what was observed, and not on what might have been observed but 
wasn't. 11 
Since tail areas are not consistent with the likelihood principle, 
"likelihooders" require another mode of inference. One such is the like-
lihood ratio test for simple n~ll and simple alternative hypotheses (but 
not the generalization for compound hypotheses which uses the maximum 
of the likelihood function in the ratio). Another is the Bayes test, 
which applies for arbitrary hypotheses. An example is described below. 
Data from an actual trial (in which the likelihood p2(1-p)8 con-
sidered above arises at one point) were considered by Cutler, et al. 
(1966) and Lachin in(Tygstrup, et al. 1982, pp. 241-242). This sequential 
trial (Freireich 1963) involved two treatments for acute leukemia. 
Patients were treated in matched pairs and the outcome of interest was 
time to remission; only the better treatment in each pair was analyzed. 
The data are shown in Table 1. Using repeated significance testing analy-
sis, P < 0.05 was attained with the 18th pair, at which time the remaining 
three pairs had already been randomized to treatment. (An interesting 
dilemna presents itself for the classical purist: to what extent should 
the last three pairs affect the P-value in this approach?--presumably not 
-7-
at all. But I prefer an approach to inference that allows for different 
inferences when the last three favor A and when they favor B.) 
The results of various analyses are also shown in Table 1. These are 
described below. 
Let pB = 1-pA be the probability that treatment Bis preferred. 
Assume that information regarding effectiveness of the two treatments 
apart from the trial is symmetric. Consider testing H
0
: PA= r vs. 
H1: pB = r (that is, PA= 1 - r) for fixed r. Also require that error 
probabilities a and B be equal. Wald's sequential likelihood ratio test 
(SLRT) (Lindgren 1976, pp. 310-317) is to continue as long as 
-1 C <A< c, 
_, 
where c = a - land A is the likelihood ratio: 
n n n -n 
= r A(l-r) B = (__r.__) A B. 
A n n 1-r ' 
r B(l-r) A 
nA and n8 are the numbers of preferences for A and B respectively. In 
general, nA and n8 are jointly sufficient; nA - nB is sufficient here 
because H0 and H1 are simple and symmetric. The appropriate P-value is 
(l+A)-l. 
P-values for the SLRT with r = 0.55, 0.6, 0.7, and 0.8 are shown for 
the accumulating data in Table 1. Significance is reached after 21, 12, 
8, and 7 pairs, respectively. 
These P-values are also Bayesian probabilities in the following set-up. 
Suppose the prior probabilities of pA =rand p8 =rare both 0.5. Then, 
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Table l. Analysis of a Sequential Trial Involving Acute Leukemia 
SLRT SLRT SLRT SLRT P(Ps>O. 5) 
Patient Preferred P-value P-value P-value P-value (Uniform 
Pair Treatment (r=0.55) (r=0.6) (r=0.7) (r=0.8) Prior) 
l A 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.25 
2 B 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
3 A 0.45 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.31 
4 A 0.40 0.31 0.16 0.059 0.19 
5 A 0.35 0.23 0.073 0.015 0.11 
6 8 0.40 0. 31 0.16 0.059 0.23 
7 A 0.35 0.23 0.073 0.015 0.14 
8 A 0.31 0.17 0.033 0.0039 0.09 
9 A 0.27 0.12 0.014 0. 0010 0.055 
10 A 0.23 0.081 0.0062 2.4x10-4 0.033 
11 A 0.20 0.055 0.0027 6. l xl o-5 0.019 
12 A 0. 17 0.038 0.0011 1. 5xl o-5 0.011 
13 A 0.14 0.025 4.9xlo-4 3.8xlo-6 0.0065 
14 8 0.17 0.038 0. 0011 l.5x10-s 0.018 
15 A 0.14 0.025 4.9xlo-4 3.8x10-6 0. 011 
16 A 0.12 0.017 2. 1 xl o-4 9.5x10-7 0.0064 
17 A 0.099 0.011 9.0xlo-5 2.4x10-7 0.0038 
18* A 0.083 0.0076 3.8xlo-5 6.0xlo-8 0.0022 
19 A 0.069 0.0051 1.1x10-5 l.Sxl o-8 0. 0013 
20 A 0.057 0.0034 1.1x10-6 3.7xlo-9 7.5xlo-4 
21 A 0.047 0.0023 3.oxio-6 9.3xlo-10 4.3x10-4 
*Significance (P<0.05) reached in actual trial analysis 
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by Bayes's theorem, the current probability of p8 = r is 
n n (0.5)r 8(1-r) A 
n n n n (0.S)r 8(1-r) A+(0.5)r A(l-r) B 
which is the P-value indicated above. 
= 1 
l+A' 
The last column in Table 1 is the probability that treatment Bis 
better than treatment A (that is, p8 > 0.5) given the current data when 
the prior distribution for p8 (and therefore also pA) is the uniform 
density on the interval (0,1). From Bayes's theorem, 
an incomplete beta function. (This probability is not a function of 
nA-nB alone.) This becomes less than 0.05 with the tenth pair and 
approximately 0.01 with the twelfth. The uniform prior may not be 
unrealistic in view of the following claim by Lachin (Tygstrup 1982, 
pp. 241-242): "When a group of physicians are shown these results line 
by line and asked when they would have been ethically compelled to stop 
the study, u sua 11 y few wou 1 d be wi 11 i ng to go beyond the twe 1 f th pair. 11 
4. Interim Analysis; An Example 
A trial is planned to compare two treatments; n = 100 paired observa-
tions are involved. One interim analysis is planned halfway through the 
study. If a significant mean difference is detected after 50 pairs then 
the trial will be stopped and significance proclaimed. Assume the 
treatment difference is normal with, for convenience, known variance. 
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Let 21 denote the standardized difference after the first 50 pairs 
and 22 the standardized difference for the second 50 pairs. The null 
hypothesis of no difference is rejected if 121 l>l .96 or if l21+22l>l.96ff 
The nominal P-value is 0.05. But the actual rejection probability when 
the null hypothesis is true is 
P ( I 2, I> 1 . 96, I Z1 +22 I >2. 7?-) 
which is obviously greater than 0.05 and is given below. 
The joint distribution of (Z1,z1+z2) under the null hypothesis is 
normal with mean vector 0 and covariance matrix 
C ~). 
So the actual P-value is 
obtained numerically. To have a true level of 0.05 requires a nominal 
level of 0.0294 (McPherson (1982) obtained 0.0300), corresponding to a 
critical value of 2.178 for 121 I and for 121+22 l/t2. 
Naturally, the nominal level decreases with the number of interim 
analyses. If, for example, the data are analyzed after each group of 
ten pairs then the nominal level becomes 0.0105 (McPherson 1982). 
The optimal number of interim analyses is discussed in the next 
section from both classical and Bayesian points of view. 
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5. The Number of Looks: Classical vs. Bayesian 
The benefit of a sequential or "group sequential" approach is the 
possibility that a small amount of data will be conclusive and allow for 
early termination of the trial. This is an important consideration when 
observations are dear. Ethical considerations when human lives are 
involved have been discussed extensively (Chalmers 1982, Weinstein 1974, 
Winfrey 1978). As another kind of example, consider a Phase I drug com-
parison trial in which myocardial infarctions are artificially induced in 
dogs, after which extensive experimental procedures are followed and 
measurements made. Such a trial can easily cost more than $1000 per dog. 
Minimizing expected costs in such a trial (subject to obtaining 
conclusive evidence) is equivalent to minimizing average sample size 
(ASN). But adjusting P-values can make the ASN increase as the number of 
looks increase, with the minimum ASN occurring in the fixed sample size 
case. 
For example, McPherson (1982) considers normal sampling (as in Section 
4) for testing the unknown mean o = 0. The ASN depends on o as well as 
the number of looks. To obtain a single measure of sample size McPherson 
averages the ASN with respect to a prior distribution on o (thereby com-
bining an otherwise classical approach with a Bayesian notion). For four 
different prior distributions, maximal reductions in ASN over fixed sample 
sizes vary from Oto about 30% with greatest savings occurring when both 
large and small deviations from o = 0 are likely a priori. In these 
examples the optimal number of looks varies from 1 to 8, with ASN increasing 
for numbers of looks greater than the optimum. 
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In a full Bayesian approach, the ASN decreases indefinitel y with the 
number of looks . The minimum occurs with a fully sequential approach in 
which accumulating data are constantly monitored. 
In analogy with McPherson (1982), assume the observations Xi are 
N(o, l ). Let the prior distribution for o be N(0, T2); this family includes 
two of McPherson's pri ors mentioned above, namely T = 0.1 and 0.2. After 
observing x1 , ... , Xn' letting Sn= r~Xi = nX, the posterior distribution 
of o i s 
( - ) N nX l 2 ' 2 
n+T n+T 
(DeGroot 1970) . 
Assume the data are to be ana lyzed in groups of s ize g; g = l is the 
fully sequential case. Initially, P( o>0) = P(o<0) = 0.5. The trial will 
be stopped after n observations if either treatment has been shown to be 
effective with sufficiently high probability: when either P( o>0jX1, ... , Xn) 
or P(o<0IX1, .. . , Xn) is greater than, say, 0.90 or 0.95. Since sampling 
can go on indefinitely in this setti ng- -in fact, the expected sample size 
is infinite--for any g and finite T, truncation is necessary. Sampling will 
be terminated (if it has not stopped previously) whenever the current 
distribution of o has standard deviation sufficiently small, say less than 
0.05. Since, in addition, P(&>0!X1, ... , Xn) will be moderate in size when 
the truncation point i s reached, the distribution of o will be heavily con-
centrated near 0, indicating that neither treatment is very much better than 
the other. The conc lusion concerning the sign of o will not be as strong as 
when sampling is terminated before the truncation point. But it is legiti-
mate to calculate P( o>0jX1, ... , Xn) or any other characteristic of 
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the posterior distribution regardless of the reason for stopping. 
(Actually, since the posterior depends on the prior, it is more appropriate 
to give the posterior for various priors, allowing the consumer to specify 
the prior.) 
-~ 
The requirement that sampling stops when (n+T-2) 2 s 0.05 is equiva-
lent ton~ 400 - T-2. The quantity n + T-2 is the sum of the actual and 
11 prior 11 sample sizes; sampling is terminated whenever this "effective 
sample size" is at least 400. 
There are at least two ways of simulating to find the distribution 
of the sample size, or its mean, using the stopping rule described above. 
One is to find the distribution as a function of o by simulating over a 
grid of values; then average with respect to the prior distribution of o. 
Another is to increment Sn with Xn+l at the nth stage using the conditional 
distribution of Sn+l given Sn: 
N n+l+T 5 , n+l+T ~ -2 -2) n+T-2 n n+T-2 
Table 2 shows the expected sample sizes evaluated using the latter approach, 
for various T and g. Evidently, great savings in sample size are possible. 
The average sample size is greatest in the fixed sample size case and 
least when the data are continually monitored. However, there are few 
trials in which the response to treatment is immediate. For this and other 
logistical reasons, continual monitoring is impossible or impractical. The 
message here is that the data should be analyzed as frequently as possible; 
nothing is lost in inferential ability when the data are analyzed often, 
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Table 2. Expected Sample Size with Maximum of 400-T -2 
Paired Observations_(and Standard Deviation) 
Number G~oup t T=0.2 T=0.5 T=l.O T=2.0 of groupst SlZe g 90% 95% 90% 95% 90% 95% 90% 95% {Approx.) (Approx.) 
1 400 375 375 396 396 399 399 400 400 
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) 
2 200 316 337 328 352 327 351 327 351 
(87) (76) {96) (89) (96) (86) (96) (86) 
3 133 280 309 282 316 281 315 281 315 
(110) (99) (120) (111) (121) ( 112) (121) (112) 
4 100 261 295 253 293 250 292 249 291 
(121) (112) (131 ) (126) (132) (126) (132) (127) 
5 80 235 275 228 269 224 267 223 265 
(125) (118) (136) (134) (135) ( 135) ( 135) (135) 
I 
..... 10 40 190 238 160 209 153 203 151 203 CJ1 
I (134) (146) (135) (146) (134) (147) (132) (148) 
15 27 167 215 130 177 122 168 117 167 
(131) (135) (130) (148) (127) (146) (125) (147) 
20 20 156 199 111 158 102 148 98 145 
(126) ( 130) (122) (144) (119) (143) (116) (142) 
25 16 144 194 101 143 89 132 85 128 
(127) (136) (119) (141 ) (112) (139) (109) (138) 
50 8 127 175 70 108 58 91 53 86 
(122) (134) (103) (130) (94) (123) (88) (121) 
100 4 117 165 52 88 37 65 33 60 
(121) (136) {88) (120) (76} (107) (70) (104) 
200 2 103* 152* 44* 68* 24 47 20 40 
(114) (133) (82) (104) (59) (93) (54) (89) 
400 1 104** 155** 38** 65** 18 37 13 26 
( 116) (135) (77) (106) (48) (81) ( 41) (69) 
Based on 5000 simulations (s.e. approx. 0.014 s.d.) except 
* 1500 simulations (s.e. approx. 0.026 s.d.) 
** 1000 simulations (s.e. approx. 0.032 s.d.) 
t These may be smaller, depending on T. For example, since 25 x 15 = 375, 
25 groups of size 15 are sufficient where T = 0.2. 
and smaller sample sizes will frequently result. (This does not mean, of 
course, that the clinician can do this frequent monitoring; the rationale 
for double-blinded studies is strong and does not depend on one's approach 
to statistical inference.) 
There are two main objections by classical statisticians to a Bayesian 
analysis. One is the difficulty and arbitrariness in picking a prior dis-
tribution. The other is the possibility of "sampling to a foregone con-
clusion." The first is a legitimate complaint; the second is not. Sampling 
to a foregone conclusion is possible in the classical set-up when one con-
siders Type I and Type II errors. But posterior probabilities do not behave 
like error probabilities. For example, suppose x1, ... , Xn have been 
observed. The probability of o>O given x1, ... , Xn, Xn+l is a random 
variable when conditioning on x1, ... , Xn. Its expected value is precisely 
the current probability of o>O; that is, the probability of o>O is a martin-
gale (unlike P-values). So if the current probability is 0.94, it can 
increase to above 0.95 with the next observation or it may decrease. In 
the case of normal sampling described above, the expected number of obser-
vations required to convert a current probability of 0.94 into one greater 
than 0.95 is infinite. 
6. Classical vs. Bayesian vs. ad hoc 
Medical researchers may not be Bayesians in any formal sense, but they 
act like Bayesians in many ways; in particular, in their lack of inhibition 
regarding interim analysis. Few reports of clinical trials that I have 
seen adjust P-values, even though data monitoring with the possibility of 
early termination has taken place. According to McPherson (1982): 11 ••• such 
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arguments [for adjusting P-values] appear not to have captured the 
imagination of the great majority of investigators." In fact, reports 
of ongoing clinical trials are published with P-values calculated as 
though the trial was fixed in size to be the current size. 
Consider the following scenario. A medical researcher adopts a 
sequential scheme--with normal observations, say. The researcher decides 
to entertain up to 10 stages, stopping before with a two-sided significance 
level of 0.05. The nominal P-value required is 0.0105. At the first 
stage, Z = 2.559 (P = 0.0105) and so the trial was stopped, with the 
researcher proclaiming P = 0.05. 
While the results are being presented at a professional meeting, a 
representative from the sponsoring agency states that the researcher was 
not to receive funding beyond the first stage in any case. Does this 
mean that, since the original intentions could not have been carried out, 
Pis actually 0.0105? 
Someone from another agency is in the audience and gets up to say 
that they knew about the trial and the first agency's plan to withdraw 
sponsorship. It seems they were willing to take over sponsorship for one 
more stage should that have been necessary. Now, Pis neither 0.0105 nor 
0.05, but 0.0185. 
On the other hand, if the second agency had said they would have taken 
over sponsorship only if the investigator would have agreed to up to 20 
stages, then the P-value becomes >0.05 and the results are not significant! 
Unless of course the researcher says he might not have agreed. What then 
is the P-value? 
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The point of this story is to suggest that it is difficult if not 
impossible to adher strictly to a classical approach. (Even more, as 
Berger (1980, p. 354) says, "In a very strict sense, one wonders how the 
classical statistician can do any analysis whatsoever.") 
P-values (calculated assuming fixed sample sizes) may be reasonable 
as measures of extremity, answering the question "How unusual are the 
data?", but they should not be taken too seriously. The casual approach 
employed by most researchers of reporting such P-values for the various 
measurements (efficacy, safety, and side effects) is not without its 
dangers. Consumers have to be educated to not necessarily act as though 
H0 is false simply because Pis small. But adjusting P-values is even 
less desirable, at least in part because it is so poorly understood by 
the consumer. If the results of a trial are published then the reader 
should be able to duplicate calculation of the given P-value without having 
to know what the investigator would have done should various contingencies 
have arisen. 
Indeed, no investigator can specify all possible contingencies. The 
statistician and the mode of inference must be flexible enough to handle 
unforeseen developments. A remark of Cornfield in {Cutler, et al. 1966) 
made in another context is appropriate here: 
Of course a re-examination in the light of results of the 
assumptions on which the pre-observational partition of 
the sample space was based would be regarded in some circles 
as ~ad statistics. It would, however, be widely regarded as 
good science. I do not believe that anything that is good 
science can be bad statistics, and conclude my remarks with 
the hope that there are no statisticians so inflexible as 
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to decline to analyze an honest body of scientific data 
simply because it fails to conform to some favored 
theoretical scheme. If there are such, however, clinical 
trials, in my opinion, are not for them. 
Acknowledgement. Chih-Kung Wu helped with the simulations reported 
in Table 2. 
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